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Introduction
Completion of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was the last 
successful ‘grand project’ in the European Union (EU). Since then, the EU 
has either failed or, at most, quite effectively – but only responds to the 
emerging challenges and problems. Moreover, ad hoc crisis management 
seems to have no end; for a dozen or so years after the EU had solved some 
problem, the next one appeared immediately. As a result, for a long time the 
EU has failed to present proposals to deepen integration of such importance 
as the EMU or the enlargement of Central and Eastern Europe.
At the same time, along with the stagnation in the deepening of inte-
gration between all the EU member states, differentiation of integration 
in the EU is progressing very rapidly. The progressing differentiation in 
the EU is a consequence of mainly two processes: reform of the euro area 
and the development of the enhanced cooperation. Reforms of the euro 
area were introduced following the economic and debt crisis that hit the 
EU after 2008 and respond to the emerging problems. And, what is espe-
cially important in the context of the topic of this article, a large part of 
the reforms is a result of intergovernmental process. On the other hand, 
enhanced cooperation applied in practice is a relatively new phenomenon. 
Although the relevant provisions have been introduced into the EU law 
under the Treaty of Amsterdam (TA), the EU Council decided for the fi rst 
time to authorize the group of EU member states for enhanced coopera-
tion in 2010. Since then, enhanced cooperation has been set up four more 
times. In this way, although according to the treaties enhanced coopera-
tion should be treated as a ‘last resort’, it becomes one of the increasingly 
important forms of integration in the EU.
Therefore, the aim of the article is to try to analyze the problem of 
whether enhanced cooperation is really treated as a ‘last resort’ or, rather, 
gradually, as a specifi c ‘bypass’, which make it possible to overcome obsta-
cles relating to launching a new integration projects. And, as a result, to 
some extent, enhanced cooperation is a way out of the problem of stagna-
tion in the integration process in the EU. 
The starting point of this analysis is the thesis on the stagnation of 
integration in the EU, that has been taking place for more than a dozen 
years. Very synthetically this issue will be addressed in the next part of the 
study. The succeeding two parts concern the development of enhanced 
cooperation and its importance in overcoming the stagnation of integra-
tion in the EU.1 The main conclusions are contained in the summary. 
1  The study is a development, updating and verifi cation of the following articles on 
enhanced cooperation: T. Kubin, Wzmocniona współpraca państw Unii Europejskiej w świetle 
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1. Stagnation in the European integration process
Since the launch of the EMU in 1999, the EU failed to successfully intro-
duce a project that would deepen integration and which could be claimed to 
have thoroughly changed the organisation, its institutions or common poli-
cies. Although it was possible to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon (TL), the provi-
sions of which changed the structure and legal nature of the EU, and which 
are essential for its operation, it remains, nevertheless, only a reaction to the 
failure to ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
One of the main reasons for this is that, for at least a few years, the 
EU has been in crisis and is struggling with a number of very serious and 
deep problems called crises. Among the most important are the follow-
ing: economic crisis after 2008 in its results, the problem of legitimacy of 
the EU institutions and politicians, the increasing threat of terrorism, the 
increasing support for extreme, radical, euro-skeptical views, parties and 
political movements in the societies of the EU member states (and their 
infl uence on activities of the so-called mainstream political parties), the 
progressive diversifi cation of EU integration and its impact on the future 
of integration within the EU, the infl ux of refugees/immigrants to the EU 
member states from the Middle East and Africa, the military confl ict in 
Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s foreign policy (especially the annexation 
of the Crimea Peninsula, what was the violation of the post-Cold War 
international order), the internal policies of the authorities of such states 
as Hungary or Poland in the context of respecting the values on which the 
EU is founded or an unprecedented event in the history of the EU (Eu-
ropean Communities, EC), which was submission 29 March 2017 by the 
prime minister of the United Kingdom Theresa May (following the refer-
endum of June 2016) notifi cation on the exit of the UK from the EU.2 
Traktatu z Lizbony (Enhanced Cooperation of the European Union States in the Light of the Lis-
bon Treaty), ”Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej”, No. 4/2010, pp. 119–135; T. Kubin, Wzmoc-
niona współpraca w Unii Europejskiej po raz trzeci. Postępujące zróżnicowanie integracji oraz 
rozwój wzmocnionej współpracy i jej znaczenie dla funkcjonowania UE (Enhanced Cooperation 
in the European Union for the Third Time. The Progressing Diversity of Integration, and the De-
velopment of Enhanced Cooperation and Its Importance for the Functioning of the EU), ”Rocznik 
Integracji Europejskiej”, No. 9/2015, pp. 57–75; T. Kubin, Still more united than diversifi ed? 
Enhanced cooperation and the progressive process of differentiated integration in the European 
Union and its implications, “Progress in Economics Research”, Vol. 35/2016, pp. 113–148; 
T. Kubin, Enhanced cooperation, EMU reforms and their implications for differentiation in the 
European Union, “Baltic Journal of European Studies”, Vol. 7, No. 2(23)/2017, pp. 84–106.
2  European Commission, Statement by the European Council (Art. 50) on the UK no-
tifi cation, Statement/17/793, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-793_
en.htm?locale=en (last visited 29.03.2017).
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One could say, that the EU (and before the EC) has had to deal with 
crises since its beginning. They have often contributed to strengthening 
and deepening of integration. It should be noted, however, that the cur-
rent list of crises in the EU is unprecedentedly long. At the same time, 
some of them in its essence refer to the very meaning of the integration 
idea and the EU as a specifi c international organization. Content of the 
White Paper presented by the European Commission in March 20173 in-
dicates, that the European Commission is aware of the importance of the 
above mentioned issues for the future of the EU.
In addition to the ‘current’ crises, we have in the EU a much deeper 
problem to deal with. It can be defi ned as a crisis of idea for further inte-
gration, that is the lack of a clearly defi ned, realistic goal of further func-
tioning of the EU as the most important integration structure in Europe. 
Precisely, it is a goal that would strengthen the feeling among the EU 
citizens, that the existence of the Union and its institutions is something 
more than just a desire to only maintain integration achievements and to 
keep the current state of affairs. The aim, which would allow to be con-
victed, that the EU and its institutions do not function on their own but 
act to achieve something more than the current exercise of their obliga-
tions under existing legislation. A goal, that would not ‘grabbed’ the EU 
citizens, but would be attractive enough, precise and universally accepted 
that it would be something we aspire to and why it is worth to sacrifi ce 
something. That would strengthen the unity of Europeans, their sense of 
community and solidarity within the EU.
Over a dozen years ago, the situation was clearly different. In the opin-
ions on the EU and its future prevailed optimism and sometimes even en-
thusiasm. For example, Robert Kagan wrote: ‘Europe would be the next super-
power, not only economically and politically but also militarily. […] In the 1990s, 
Europeans could still confi dently assert that the power of a unifi ed Europe would 
restore, fi nally, the global “multipolarity” that had been destroyed by the Cold War 
and its aftermath’.4 A unique manifesto of optimism and faith in Europe was 
the book of Jeremy Rifkin The European Dream. How Europe’s Vision of the 
Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream. J. Rifkin wrote among oth-
ers: ‘one could point to many reasons why Europeans seem to be leading the way 
into the new era’.5 and ‘European dream’ – understood by J. Rifkin as ‘an ef-
3  European Commission, White Paper on the future of Europe. Refl ections and scenarios for 
the EU27 by 2025, European Commission COM(2017) 2025 of 1 March 2017, Brussels.
4  R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, New 
York 2003, p. 20.
5  J. Rifkin, The European Dream. How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing 
the American Dream, New York 2004, p. 18. 
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fort at creating a new historical frame’, in which the most important values 
are peace, harmony, quality of life, sustainability, human relations, respect 
for cultural diversity, human rights, prosperity, global cooperation, human 
spiritual development, idealism (in opposition to materialism and the accu-
mulation of wealth) – ‘creates a new history’6 and takes humanity into ‘the 
light of a new future motivated by idealism’.7
Today’s moods are completely different. According to Jan Zielonka, 
‘the European Union was once considered to be the most successful modern inte-
gration project. However, in recent years it has been a shame’.8 Zbigniew Cza-
chór writes about the problem of ‘exhaustion of ideas’ relating to the EU 
future, what is the reason of so rare in recent years the voices about what 
would be the fi nalite politique of the European integration.9 According to 
J. Zielonka, the most serious crisis in the EU is in fact the crisis of ‘cohe-
sion, imagination and trust’10 and the real cause of the current disintegra-
tion are the ‘unfulfi lled promises’ of the EU.11 As a result, ‘the European 
Union is probably doomed to destruction’.12
2. Development of the enhanced cooperation in the European Union
As mentioned, the provisions on enhanced cooperation were introduced 
into the EU law under TA. Later, in the Treaty of Nice (TN) and the Treaty 
of Lisbon (TL) they have been amended. In this section the legal basis 
of enhanced cooperation in the EU and fi ve cases of its establishment are 
shown. The fi rst three cases of enhanced cooperation have already been 
presented elsewhere13 and in this study will only be listed. Then, only the 
last two cases of enhanced cooperation will be described wider.
The provisions allowing for the establishment of enhanced coopera-
tion were contained in Art. 43–45 of the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU) in a version as amended by virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam.14 
6  Ibidem, p. 22.
7  Ibidem, p. 23.
8  J. Zielonka, Koniec Unii Europejskiej? (Is the EU Doomed?), Warszawa 2014, p. 12. 
9  Z. Czachór, Kryzys w Unii Europejskiej. Propozycje nowych pól badawczych (The Eu-
ropean Union Crisis. Proposals of New Research Fields and Questions), ”Rocznik Integracji 
Europejskiej”, No. 9/2015, p. 10.
10  J. Zielonka, op.cit., p. 21. 
11  Ibidem, p. 52. 
12  Ibidem, p. 11. 
13  T. Kubin, Still more…, op.cit.
14  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities and certain related acts, signed at Amsterdam, 2 Octo-
ber 1997, OJ 1997 C 340/1. About the course of the Intergovernmental Conference and the 
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The detailed arrangements concerning the possibility of establishing en-
hanced cooperation within the framework of the former so-called I EU 
pillar, were contained in art. 11 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC) and in Art. 40 of the TEU15 in the framework of the 
III EU pillar. In the former so-called II EU pillar (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy), the TA did not foresee any possibility to establish en-
hanced cooperation. One of its intermediate forms, was the so-called con-
structive abstention, regulated by Art. 23 of the TEU. 
The Treaty of Nice16 (TN) contains, among others, a few detailed 
amendments concerning enhanced cooperation, which were introduced 
to the above-mentioned articles of the TEU and the TEC. In addition, it 
introduced the possibility of establishing enhanced cooperation also in 
the former so-called II EU pillar – relevant provisions were included in 
art. 27a – 27e of the TEU.17 
In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon,18 arrange-
ments for enhanced cooperation have been included both in the TEU19 
and in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union.20 The TEU includes title IV, i.e. ‘Provisions on en-
hanced cooperation’, consisting only of Art. 20 which provides a very 
general framework for the possibility of establishing enhanced coopera-
tion. The detailed regulations, which clarify the content of Art. 20 of 
the TEU, are contained in title III of the TFEU, ‘Enhanced cooperation’ 
(Art. 326–334). The TL also provides for the possibility of establishing 
“permanent structured cooperation” (PESCO) in the area of EU’s com-
mon security and defence policy. Its general framework is governed by 
provisions on enhanced cooperation contained in the TA see: F. Tuytschaever, Differentia-
tion in European Law, Oxford 1999, pp. 33–104.
15  Treaty on European Union, OJ 1992 C 191/1.
16  Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts, signed at Nice, 26 February 2001, OJ 
2001 C 80/1.
17  T. Kubin, Zdynamizowanie procesu integracji czy członkostwo różnych kategorii? Zagad-
nienie wzmocnionej współpracy w Unii Europejskiej (Speeding up the Process of Integration or 
Membership of Different Categories? The Issue of Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union) 
in: Unia Europejska i Polska wobec dylematów integracyjnych na początku XXI wieku (The 
European Union and Poland in the Face of Integration Dilemmas at the Beginning of the 21st 
Century), M. Stolarczyk (ed.), Toruń 2006, pp. 175–193.
18  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ 2007 C 306/1.
19  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union, OJ 2012 C 326/1.
20  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, OJ 
2012 C 326/1.
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Art. 42, section 6 of the TEU, whereas detailed provisions are included 
in Art. 46 of the TEU and in the new protocol appended to the treaties, 
(Protocol No 10).
Exceptions to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police co-
operation within the EU area of freedom, security and justice were intro-
duced to the provisions contained in the said articles by virtue of the TL. 
In accordance with the TFEU, in the cases referred to in Art. 82, section 
2, Art. 83, section 1, Art. 86, section 1, and Art. 87, section 2, the proce-
dure for establishing enhanced cooperation is slightly different.21 
For about a decade since the introduction of the TA, the provisions 
concerning enhanced cooperation were not used in practice.22 Theoretical 
attempts to explain how and when enhanced cooperation is undertaken 
were made by e.g. Daniela A. Kroll and Dirk Leuffen.23 For the fi rst time, 
the EU Council decided that all the conditions required by the TEU and 
the TFEU for it to be established have been met, and adopted the relevant 
decision on 20 December 2010.24 This decision concerned the applicable 
law for divorces and separations became applicable on 21 June 2012.25 
The establishment of enhanced cooperation for the second time con-
cerned unitary patent protection (UPP) in the EU.26 The decision to un-
dertake enhanced cooperation was taken in accordance with Art. 329, sec-
tion 1 of the TFEU by the EU Council of 10 March 2011.27 The package 
making up the UPP consists of two regulations: one concerning unitary 
21  See more: T. Kubin, Wzmocniona współpraca państw…, op.cit.
22  Till 2010 enhanced cooperation was not used in practice but was a subject of scientifi c 
interest. See, for example: M. Bordignon, S. Brusco, On enhanced cooperation, “Journal of 
Public Economics”, Vol. 90/2006, Issue 10/11, pp. 2063–2090; A. de Gomes, N. Norberto, 
Enhanced cooperation: the ultimate challenge of managing diversity in Europe: new perspectives 
on the European integration process, “Intereconomics”, Vol. 40/2005, issue 4, pp. 201–216.
23  D.A. Kroll, D. Leuffen, Enhanced cooperation in practice: An analysis of differenti-
ated integration in EU secondary law, “Journal of European Public Policy”, Vol. 22, No. 
3/2015, pp. 353–373.
24  Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing en-
hanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, OJ 
2010 L 343/10.
25  T. Kubin, Wzmocniona współpraca w Unii..., op.cit., pp. 62–63. On works resulting 
in enhanced cooperation in law for divorces and separations: K. Boele-Woelki, To be or not 
to be: enhanced cooperation in international divorce law within the European Union, “Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review”, Vol. 39/2008, Issue 4, pp. 779–792. 
26  The Road to establishing enhanced cooperation in the UPP and its legal analysis 
see: S. Peers, The constitutional implications of the EU patent, “European Constitutional Law 
Review”, Vol. 7/2011, Issue 2, pp. 229–266. 
27  Council Decision of 10 March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of 
creation of unitary patent protection (2011/167/EU), OJ 2011 L 76/53.
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patent protection,28 the related appropriate language regulations29 and an 
international agreement that is expected to create a Single Patent Court 
before which disputes would be settled.30
The third instance of when enhanced cooperation was established 
with regard to the fi nancial transaction tax (FTT), what was associated 
with the economic crisis. After the whole procedure,31 the EU Council 
adopted a decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
FTT on 22 January, 2013.32 As a consequence of this decision, on 14 Feb-
ruary, 2013 the Commission adopted a proposal concerning the Council 
directive on the implementation of enhanced cooperation in the fi eld of 
the FTT, which was based on the Commission’s proposal of 2011.33 Work 
on this directive is still ongoing in the Council.34
The fourth decision to establish enhanced cooperation in the EU is 
related to property issues of international couples and forms a part of the 
28  Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of uni-
tary patent protection, OJ 2012 L 361/1.
29  Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing en-
hanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to 
the applicable translation arrangements, OJ 2012 L 361/89.
30  Agreement on a Unifi ed Patent Court, OJ 2013 C 175/1.
31  Most important steps: European Commission, Proposal for a Council Direc-
tive on a common system of fi nancial transaction tax amending Directive 2008/7/EC, 
COM(2011) 594 fi nal, Brussels, 28.09.2011; European Parliament, Legislative resolution 
of 23 May 2012 on the proposal for a Council directive on a common system of fi nan-
cial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC (COM(2011) 0594 – C7-0355/2011 
– 2011/0261(CNS)); European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion of the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a common 
system of fi nancial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC’ COM(2011) 594 
fi nal, OJ 2012 C 181/55; Committee of the Regions (2012). Opinion of the Committee of 
the Regions on a common system of fi nancial transaction tax, OJ 2012 C 113/7; European 
Commission, Proposal for a Council decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the 
area of fi nancial transaction tax, COM(2012) 631 fi nal/2; European Parliament, Legisla-
tive resolution of 12 December 2012 on the proposal for a Council decision authorising 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of fi nancial transaction tax (COM(2012) 
0631 – C7-0396/2012 – 2012/0298(APP)).
32  Council Decision of 22 January 2013 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area 
of fi nancial transaction tax (2013/52/EU), OJ 2013 L 22/11.
33  European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of fi nancial transaction tax, COM(2013) 71 fi nal, Brussles, 
14.02.2013.
34  On the FTT see, for example: L. Bettendorf, A.Van Der Horst, R. De Mooij, H. 
Vrijburg, Corporate tax consolidation and enhanced cooperation in the European Union, “Fiscal 
Studies”, Vol. 31/2010, Issue 4, pp. 453–479.
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legal regulations adopted at EU level in the area of judicial cooperation in 
civil matters. The road to adoption of the regulation was very long. In the 
Brussels Convention of 1968, matters concerning jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
have been regulated.35 Later, the Brussels Convention has been converted 
into regulation36 (so called Brussels I regulation). Further regulations in 
this sphere concerned jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental respon-
sibility for children of both spouses37 (repealed in 200338) and insolvency 
proceedings.39 Matters related rights in property arising out of a matri-
monial relationship remained outside the ambit of any instrument appli-
cable between the EU member states and were included in 2000 Council 
programme of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual 
recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters.40 Provisions on 
judicial cooperation in civil matters were also contained in Title IV of 
Amsterdam Treaty.
The European Council met in Brussels on 4–5 November 2004 adopted 
The Hague programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the Euro-
pean Union, in which asked the Commission to present a Green Paper on 
the confl ict of laws in matters concerning matrimonial property regimes, 
including the question of jurisdiction and mutual recognition.41
In response, on 17 July 2006 the Commission adopted the Green Pa-
per on the confl ict of laws in matters concerning matrimonial property regimes.42 
35  Original version: Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 1978 L 304/77. Consolidated ver-
sion: 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (consolidated version), OJ 1998 C27/1. 
36  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2001 L 12/1.
37  Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental 
responsibility for children of both spouses, OJ 2000 L 160/19.
38  Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of 
parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, OJ 2003 L 338/1.
39  Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, 
OJ 2000 L 160/1.
40  Draft programme of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual recog-
nition of decisions in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2001 C 12/1.
41  The Hague programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the Euro-
pean Union, OJ 2005 C 53/1.
42  Green Paper on the confl ict of laws in matters concerning matrimonial property 
regimes, COM(2006) 400 fi nal, Brussels 17.07.2006.
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The document launched consultations on aspects of the diffi culties faced 
by couples in Europe when it comes to the liquidation of their common 
property and the legal remedies available. 
At its meeting in Brussels on 10–11 December 2009, the European 
Council adopted another multiannual programme The Stockholm pro-
gramme – an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens.43
In the EU Citizenship Report 2010: Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ 
rights,44 adopted on 27 October 2010, the Commission identifi ed uncertain-
ty surrounding the property rights of international couples as one of the 
main obstacles faced by EU citizens in their daily lives when they tried to 
exercise the rights the EU conferred on them across national borders. Con-
sequently, on 16 March 2011, the Commission adopted a proposal for a two 
Council regulations: on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes45 
and regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships.46
In the context of enhanced cooperation, the Council meeting of 3 De-
cember 2015 was very signifi cant. The Council concluded, that no una-
nimity could be reached for the adoption of the above mentioned propos-
als and that the objectives of cooperation in this area could not be attained 
within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole. Then, from Decem-
ber 2015 to February 2016, in total eighteen EU member states (see table 
1) addressed requests to the Commission indicating, that they wished to 
establish enhanced cooperation relating to the property regimes of inter-
national couples. 2 March 2016 Commission submitted the appropriate 
fi nal proposal47 and 9 June 2016 Council, on requests made by eighteen 
EU member states, adopted the decision authorising enhanced coopera-
tion in property regimes of international couples.48 The European Parlia-
43  The Stockholm programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens, OJ 2010 C 115/1. 
44  EU Citizenship Report 2010: Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights, 
COM(2010) 603 fi nal, Brussels, 27.10.2010.
45  Proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM(2011) 
126 fi nal, Brussels, 16.03.2011.
46  Proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered part-
nerships, COM(2011) 127 fi nal, Brussels, 16.03.2011.
47  Proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes COM(2016) 106 
fi nal, Brussels, 02.03.2016.
48  Council decision (EU) 2016/954 of 9 June 2016 authorising enhanced cooperation 
in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of deci-
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ment, in its opinion of 23 June 2016, approved the Commission proposal49 
and 24 June 2016 Council adopted regulation implementing the 2016/954 
decision on this enhanced cooperation.50 On the basis of Art. 70, the regu-
lation shall apply from 29 January 2019.51
The latest, fi fth decision to establish enhanced cooperation concerns the 
appointment European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce (EPPO). The legal ba-
sis of the EPPO establishment is Art. 86 TFEU. It is an independent EU 
institution, which main aim is to investigate and prosecute crimes against 
the EU’s fi nancial interests, especially the EU budget. Prosecuting offences 
against the EU budget was the competence of the EU member states but its 
authorities could act only within their own borders. At the same time, EU 
bodies – like OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Offi ce), Europol or Eurojust – 
had not enough legal basis and practical possibilities to act in such cases 
effi ciently. As the Commission wrote, Eurojust and Europol had ‘a general 
mandate to facilitate exchange of information and coordinate national criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, but lack the power to carry out acts of investigation 
or prosecution themselves. The European Anti-Fraud Offi ce (OLAF) have a man-
date to investigate fraud and illegal activities affecting the EU, but its powers are 
limited to administrative investigations’.52 The EPPO its tasks should perform 
under directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the EP and of the Council.53 The cen-
tral offi ce – European Chief Prosecutor – is to be supported by European 
Prosecutors (one in each EU member state which participate in enhanced 
cooperation) and investigatory and technical staff.
The main steps on the way to enhanced cooperation in the EPPO were 
as follows. 17 July 2013 Commission submitted proposal for a Council 
sions on the property regimes of international couples, covering both matters of matrimo-
nial property regimes and the property consequences of registered partnerships, OJ 2016 
L159/16.
49  European Parliament legislative resolution of 23 June 2016 on the proposal for 
a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes (COM(2016) 0106 – C8-0127/2016 
– 2016/0059(CNS)).
50  Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced coop-
eration in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, OJ 2016 L183/1.
51  Except for Art. 63 and 64 which shall apply from 29 April 2018 and Art. 65, 66 and 
67 which shall apply from 29 July 2016.
52  Proposal for a Council regulation on establishment of the European Public Prosecu-
tor’s Offi ce, COM(2013) 534 fi nal, Brussels 17.07.2013, p. 2.
53  Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 
2017 on the fi ght against fraud to the Union’s fi nancial interests by means of criminal law, 
OJ 2017 L 198/29.
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regulation on the establishment EPPO.54 11 December 2013 opinion of 
this proposal gave the Economic and Social Committee.55 7 February 2017 
the Council concluded the lack of unanimity in support of the regulation 
creating the EPPO, what paved the way the enhanced cooperation estab-
lishment.56 As a result, 3 April 2017 sixteen EU member states (later, be-
tween 19 April 2017 and 22 June 2017, next four joined them – see table 1) 
notifi ed the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 
their wish to launch an enhanced cooperation to establish a EPPO.57 5 Oc-
tober 2017 the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on 
the draft Council regulation implementing enhanced cooperation on the 
establishment of the EPPO.58 Finally, 12 October 2017 Council adopted 
regulation implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of 
the EPPO.59
As it was mentioned, TL introduced the possibility for a group of the 
EU member states to strengthen their cooperation in defence area by cre-
ating permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). During the meeting 
22–23 June 2017, the European Council called for the joint development 
of capability projects in defence and agreed on the need to launch PES-
CO.60 In September 2017, ministers of defence of the EU member states, 
during the informal meeting in Tallinn, presented a list of common com-
mitments in the main areas of the Protocol 10 of the treaties, namely de-
fence investment, capability development and operational readiness.61 On 
13 November 2017 ministers from 23 member states (see table 1) signed 
54  Proposal for a Council regulation on establishment of the European Public Prosecu-
tor’s Offi ce, COM(2013) 534 fi nal, Brussels 17.07.2013. 
55  Economic and Social Committee: Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce COM(2013) 534 fi nal. SOC/491, Brussels 11 December 2013. 
56  Outcome of the Council Meeting. 3517th Council meeting. 6035/17, Brussels, 
07.02.2017.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22282/st06035en17.pdf (last visited 15.11.2017).
57  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/03/eppo/ (last vis-
ited 15.11.2017)
58  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/printsummary.pdf?id=1506690&l=en 
&t=E (last visited 16.11.2017)
59  Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced co-
operation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce (‘the EPPO’), 
OJ 2017 L 283/1. 
60  European Council meeting (22 and 23 June 2017) – Conclusions. EUCO 8/17 http://
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8-2017-INIT/en/pdf (last visited 16.11.2017).
61  https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage_en/31832/Permanent% 
20Structured%20Cooperation%20on%20defence%20could%20be%20launched%20by%20
end%202017 (last visited 16.11.2017).
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Table 1. Membership of the EU states in established enhanced cooperations 
(in December 2017)
State
Enhanced cooperation
appli-
cable
divorce 
law
unitary 
patent
fi nancial
tran-
saction
tax
property 
regimes of
international
couples
European
Public 
Prosecutor’s
Offi ce
Permanent
Structured
Coopera-
tion
Austria + + + + + +
Belgium + + + + + +
Bulgaria + + - + + +
Croatia - - - + + +
Cyprus - + - + + +
Czech Republic - + - + + +
Denmark - + - - - -
Estonia + + - - + +
Finland - + - + + +
France + + + + + +
Greece + + + + + +
Gremany + + + + + +
Hungary + + - - - +
Ireland - + - - - +
Italy + + + + + +
Latvia + + - - + +
Lithuania + + - - + +
Luxembourg + + - + + +
Malta + + - + - -
Netherlands - + - + - +
Poland - + - - - +
Portugal + + + + + +
Romania + + - - + +
Slovakia - + + - + +
Slovenia + + + + + +
Spain + - + + + +
Sweden - + - + - +
United Kingdom - + - - - -
Source: own work on the basis of relevant decisions of the Council of the EU. 
a joint notifi cation on the permanent structured cooperation, what was 
the fi rst formal step to set up the PESCO. The notifi cation contains the 
principles of PESCO (Annex I), list of common commitments (Annex II) 
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and proposals on PESCO governance (Annex III).62 The notifi cation 
paved the way for the Council decision launching PESCO, what is pos-
sible by the end of 2017.
3. Signifi cance of the enhanced cooperation in the context of inte-
gration stagnation 
Enhanced cooperation, introduced into EU primary law by the TA,63 
is one of the examples of the fl exibility of the process of integration, and 
its introduction into EU’s primary law was de jure a strengthening and 
confi rmation of the departure from the general principle (this situation 
was de facto present from the inception of the EC64) stating, that within 
the framework of the integration process, all the EU (EC) member states 
shall adopt the same legal regulations at the same time. 
Katharina Holzinger and Frank Schimmelfennig write, that ‘the litera-
ture on differentiated integration shows a striking imbalance between overconcep-
tualization, undertheorization and even less systematic data collection and analy-
sis’.65 According to opinion of Zhelyazkova, the main theories of European 
integration, such as (liberal) intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism or 
constructivism, ‘have not tried to explain the observed patterns of differentiation. 
Instead, research on the causes and consequences of differentiated integration has 
developed from general discussions about the alleged trade-off between deeper and 
broader participation in multilateral agreements’.66 A synthetic overview of the 
theoretical approaches, concepts and typologies relating to the differentia-
tion of integration provide K. Holzinger and F. Schimmelfenning.67
In the process of European integration, we are dealing with a set of 
three closely related trends: deepening (new common policies and the 
62  Notifi cation on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notifi cation.pdf (last visited 16.11.2017).
63  Enhanced cooperation apart from cooperation based on special arrangements 
(largely via ‘protocolization’) and constructive abstention and opt-outs, was one of the 
three types of fl exibility in the TA. See: E. Philippart, G. Edwards, The Provisions on Closer 
Cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam: The Politics of Flexibility in the European Union, “Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 37, No. 1/1999, p. 98.
64  T. Kubin, Wzmocniona współpraca w Unii..., op.cit., pp. 59–61. 
65  K. Holzinger, F. Schimmelfennig, Differentiated Integration in the European Union: 
Many Concepts, Sparse Theory, Few Data, “Journal of European Public Policy”, Vol. 19, No. 
2/2012, p. 302. 
66  A. Zhelyazkova, From selective integration into selective implementation: The link be-
tween differentiated integration and conformity with EU laws, “European Journal of Political 
Research”, Vol. 53, No. 4/2014, pp. 727–746.
67  K. Holzinger, F. Schimmelfennig, op.cit. 
45
Tomasz Kubin, A ‘Last Resort’ or a ‘Bypass’? Development of Enhanced Cooperation...
progressive centralisation in already existing common policies), widen-
ing (the adoption of new member states) and, especially since the 1990s, 
differentiation. Between them there are close interconnections and inter-
dependencies, but their nature is clearly changing. 
Though the European Communities were, generally, ‘based on the 
principle of equal rights and obligations for all member states with respect to all 
Community policies’,68 a certain level of differentiated integration in the 
EC (and later in the EU) has been present since the beginning of the 
integration process, and the number of these differences increased as the 
process progressed. At the beginning of the EC, integration was limited 
territorially (horizontally) and functionally (vertically) with a high level 
of unifi cation.69 From 1958, F. Schimmelfenning and Winzen found 194 
differentiations (lasting at least one year), 82 of which were introduced 
by the reform treaty and 112 by accession.70 At the same time, before the 
entry into force of the TM, the scale of differentiation in the primary law 
was very low-only 1–2 per cent of all treaty articles had an actual differ-
entiation. With the entry into force of the Schengen agreements, this rose 
to above 30 per cent. The enlargement of the EU to include countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, the TL, and the reforms in the EU meant an 
increase in the relevant provisions of the treaties which signifi ed a differ-
entiation in the EU to a level of around 43 per cent at the end of 2012.71 
Currently, the progressing differentiation in the EU is a consequence of 
three key processes. The fi rst source of differentiation of integration is the 
widening of the EU. So far, the subsequent stages of EU widening (previ-
ously widening of the European Communities) were accompanied by far-
reaching measures aimed at deepening integration. In a nutshell, in the 
1970s, when the fi rst enlargement of the EC was a foregone conclusion, 
a project which was to deepen integration included a plan to introduce 
a monetary union on the basis of Pierre Werner’s Report. The accession 
of Greece, Spain and Portugal was accompanied by the introduction of di-
68  A. Kölliker, Flexibility and European Unifi cation. The Logic of Differentiated Integra-
tion, Lanham 2006, p. 2. 
69  D. Leuffen, B. Rittberger, F. Schimmelfenning, Differentiated Integration. Explaining 
Variation in the European Union, Basingstoke 2013, pp. 26–27.
70  F. Schimmelfenning, T. Winzen, Instrumental and Constitutional Differentiation in the 
European Union, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 52, No. 2/2014, p. 364.
71  Ibidem, p. 358. On the differentiation in the TEEC, the SEA and the TM also 
writes: F. Tuytschaever, op.cit., pp. 7–32. T. Winzen writes on the differentiation in the 
EU in secondary law: T. Winzen, From Capacity to Sovereignty: Legislative Politics and Dif-
ferentiated Integration in the European Union, “European Journal of Political Research”, Vol. 
55/2016, Issue 1, pp. 100–119.
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rect elections to the European Parliament and, above all, implementation 
of the SEA and fi nalising the construction of the single market. The EU 
enlargement of 1995 was correlated with the establishment of the EU and 
in its framework, with the creation of the EMU, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and establishment of cooperation in the area of Justice and 
Home Affairs. Until then, there was no dilemma between deepening and 
widening – these two dimensions of integration went hand-in-hand. The 
deepening of integration did not constitute an obstacle for the subsequent 
countries seeking accession.72 However, it is necessary to mention, such 
a far-fetched deepening of integration in some member states raised objec-
tions, which was manifested e.g. by regulations permitting for the UK and 
Denmark to remain outside the eurozone, for some EU countries to remain 
outside the Schengen zone or that the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ire-
land were not bound by provisions relating to visas, asylum, immigration 
and other policies related to the free movement of people. In this way, the 
deepening of integration contributed to its further differentiation. 
The three subsequent treaties – the TA, TN and TL were supposed to 
reform the EU so that it was able to function effectively after accepting 
more than a dozen countries from Central and Eastern Europe. It should 
be noted that the treaty, which changed the EU the most in the context 
of its enlargement, i.e. the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
did not enter into force and the TL was adopted in consequence of this 
fact. However, ever since the EU was enlarged by the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, a new situation evolved. This extension, the greatest 
in history, was not accompanied by an adequate, successful, deepening of 
integration. And differentiation of integration in the EU became ‘ad hoc 
responses to the challenges arising out of the growing number of Member States 
and their increasing differentiation’.73 
The second root of differentiation of integration in the EU are reforms 
of the euro area introduced in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, which 
meant the deepening of integration, albeit only between states belonging 
to the monetary union. As a consequence, the differences in the depth of 
integration between the states belonging and not belonging to the euro-
zone are deepening further still.
And the third source of differentiation of integration in the EU is the 
practical application of the provisions on enhanced cooperation, which 
had remained dormant for about a decade. 
72  D. Leuffen, B. Rittberger, F. Schimmelfenning, op.cit., p. 21.
73  J. Barcz, Flexible Integration: a Target System of EU Governance, “Yearbook of Polish 
European Studies”, Vol. 18/2015, p. 77. 
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The quintuple establishment of enhanced cooperation since the year 
2010 means, that it is becoming an integral part of the functioning of the 
EU. Moreover, the issues on behalf of which enhanced cooperation was 
established, are not of a marginal nature, but are without a doubt very 
important as they affect very many actors, have a signifi cant impact on 
their situation and acting and, therefore, are likely to result in confl icts of 
interest and disputes. 
Furthermore, taking into account the categorization made by 
F. Tuytschaever,74 it should be pointed out, that in so far as the changes in 
the treaties, that led to differentiation in integration before the TA, were 
of a ‘negative’ nature, i.e. they allowed certain countries of the EU (EC) 
not to participate in selected integrating projects. However, enhanced co-
operation signifi ed a differentiation of integration of a ‘positive’ nature, 
i.e. it provided those member states, that had the will and means with 
the possibility of participating in the cooperation. The difference lies in 
the fact, that the potential differentiation of integration resulting from 
enhanced cooperation is, at least theoretically, unlimited. 
In the context of the infl uence of enhanced cooperation on the inte-
gration progress and of the main problem of this study, the following 
question can be posed: why should a group of EU countries, that wish to 
deepen integration, be restricted in their efforts to deeper integration by 
another state or several states unwilling to do so? It seems, that it would 
be diffi cult to justify why an EU state or a small group of states should 
be conferred the right to block other member states in enhancing their 
mutual integration. Provisions on enhanced cooperation can be seen as 
an answer to this problem. 
The impact of enhanced cooperation on the prevention of stagnation in 
the process of integration can be at least twofold. Firstly, the states which 
establish such cooperation may become a pioneering group that sets the 
trends, and after some time they are joined by more member states en-
couraged by their example.75 Such a model is delivered especially in the 
framework of the EMU – the fi rst 11 EU countries qualifi ed for the third 
stage of Monetary Union in 1998 were joined later by other states. As 
stated Danuta Hübner, a former member of the European Commission, 
‘what is called [...] enhanced cooperation is an important element stimulating 
integration. It speeds up its development’.76 
74  F. Tuytschaever, op.cit.
75  A. Kölliker, op.cit.
76  D. Hübner, Przesilenie przed dobrym fi nałem (Turning-point before a good fi nal). Inter-
view with Danuta Hübner, “Tygodnik Powszechny”, 22.06.2003.
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Secondly, the possibility that only part of the member states decide 
to deepen integration, can act as a deterrent for the other EU member 
states, which approach such a deepening from a distance or even with 
reluctance. Fear of marginalisation, non-participation in the integration 
process fully, or bearing the mark of a secondary EU member state may 
prompt these countries to join in the efforts to deepen integration, as it 
might be better to participate in such a venture and attempt to infl uence 
the content of the amendments to suit its own interests from the inside 
than to stand on the sidelines and have no impact on the process what-
soever. The theoretical approach proposed by D.A. Kroll and D. Leuffen 
acknowledges, that the possibility of establishing enhanced cooperation 
is a factor which is conducive to the adoption of solutions by all EU mem-
ber states.77 In theory, remaining outside an integration project by an EU 
member state means greater autonomy at the expense of a smaller say on 
the decisions being made. Empirical studies suggest, that in some cases 
the difference between insiders and outsiders is vague and these coun-
tries have some infl uence on the content of the adopted legislation, as 
in the case of the United Kingdom and Denmark with regard to justice 
and home affairs.78 The results of other studies (relating to the remain-
ing of United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden outside of the eurozone) 
indicate, that remaining outside, which results in e.g. ‘decreasing access 
to informal networks’ in the decision-making process of the EU institu-
tions, does not actually have to take place in practice.79 Therefore ‘fl exible 
integration may be a more realistic solution for dealing with intensifi ed preference 
heterogeneity in the EU than previously anticipated’.80
Another theoretical advantage of enhanced cooperation is that it is in-
tended to prevent integration activities outside the EU framework (alter-
native integration81). Then, it is a kind of compromise between the unitary 
integration of all the EU member states (when there is no possibility of 
reaching an agreement) and cooperation outside the EU legal framework. 
In this context there is a less risk of integration differentiation than in the 
77  D.A. Kroll, D. Leuffen, op.cit., p. 367.
78  R. Adler-Nissen, Behind the Scenes of Differentiated Integration: Circumventing Na-
tional Opt-Outs in Justice and Home Affairs, “Journal of European Public Policy”, Vol. 16, 
No. 1/2009, pp. 64–65.
79  D. Naurin, R. Lindahl, Out in the cold? Flexible integration and the political status of 
Euro opt-outs, “European Union Politics”, Vol. 11, No. 4/2010, pp. 485–509.
80  Ibidem, pp. 505–506. 
81  N. Groenendijk, Enhanced cooperation: the way out or a non-starter? in: Unresolved 
Issues of the European Constitution – Rethinking the Crisis, N. Neuwahl, S. Haack (eds.), Mon-
treal 2007, pp. 266–274.
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case of an alternative integration – because it is based on the EU law, its 
democratic legitimacy is stronger, it does not allow integration beyond 
the EU competences and because of the less transaction costs (relating 
to preparation, negotiation, ratifi cation and application of a multilateral 
agreement). And non-EU states can not participate in it.82
However, the undertaking of enhanced cooperation by a group of EU 
states may lead to a series of signifi cant complications for the process of 
integration. Firstly, what is most important in the context of the main 
problem of the article, is the right, optimal balance between supranational 
and intergovernmental forms of cooperation in the EU. Eric Philippart 
and Geoffrey Edwards wrote about the introduction of the provisions on 
enhanced cooperation stating ‘if it is not a revolution insofar as orthodoxy 
was always more a pious aspiration then a reality, it is a major modifi ca-
tion of the ethos of the Community-method’.83
On the one hand, the EU must provide an enough fl exible, working 
mechanism of integration – what, as mentioned above, is more and more 
diffi cult in the context of the process of the EU widening. Otherwise, 
stagnation of integration among the all EU member states will inevitably 
result in proliferation of forms of cooperation outside the EU legal and in-
stitutional framework. On the other hand, enhanced cooperation should 
be, at least theoretically and according to its legal basis, solution of a last 
resort, ’the decision authorising enhanced cooperation shall be adopted by the 
Council as a last resort, when it has established that the objectives of such coop-
eration cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole’ 
(Art. 20.2 TEU). Five cases of enhanced cooperation (and prospects for 
establishing PESCO in the near future) during a few years raise a ques-
tion, if each case was a really ‘last resort’ or rather a ‘bypass’. It must be 
mentioned in this context, that works on the each established enhanced 
cooperation lasted long or very long84 and that neither the treaties, nor the 
EU CoJ jurisdiction contain the precise defi nition of the term of ‘reason-
able period’. 
But the above mentioned deterrence function of enhanced coopera-
tion can also be looked at from another perspective. The point is that 
some EU member states which do not intend to take part in an integra-
tion project in the framework of the EU, may treat the risk of participat-
82  Ibidem, pp. 104–106. 
83  E. Philippart, G. Edwards, op.cit., p. 105.
84  For example, in the case of UPP work on this system lasted over 30 years. European 
Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protec-
tion, COM(2011) 215 fi nal, Brussles, 13.04.2011.
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ing in enhanced cooperation by a group of EU states as a certain kind of 
‘blackmail’. As a result, participation in such an integration project may 
be perceived as something imposed, since the decision to participate in 
it will be made more for fear of remaining outside the mainstream of in-
tegration and being marginalised, rather than because of the perception 
that participation in the project is done for the interest of the state and 
due to a genuine desire to deepen integration.85 
Secondly, if a group of the EU states participates in all (or most) of 
enhanced cooperations, this group will be seen as an avant-garde demon-
strating a clearly deeper degree of integration compared with the other 
EU member states. In this situation, enhanced cooperation could become 
a factor leading rather to the disintegration within the EU and promot-
ing the differentiation of the EU states rather than a deepening of their 
integration. This problem could be even further aggravated if the partici-
pation of the particular EU states in subsequent enhanced cooperations 
is concurrent with their membership in the eurozone. The consequence 
would be the breakdown of the EU into ‘core’ states and ‘periphery’ states. 
Looking at the table 1, and having in mind the EU member states par-
ticipating in the eurozone, it seems, that ‘the core’ of the EU is gradually 
more and more clear. 
Another problem associated with enhanced cooperation is related to 
the EU legal system, that is its compliance with the fundamental princi-
ples of integration in the EU, which include, among others, the princi-
ple of solidarity, equality of the member states and the unity of EU legal 
standards. According to e.g. Slawomir Dudzik, enhanced cooperation al-
lows for the ‘replacement, at least in some cases, of the joint efforts of all 
member states to achieve defi ned integration objectives by the actions 
of only some states’. It also ‘introduces exemptions from the principle 
of equality of the member states’ with regard to EU law, because it leads 
to an “unjustifi ed diversifi cation of the rights and responsibilities of the 
member states depending on whether they participate in circles of coop-
eration and how many such circles there are”. In addition, the frequent 
use of enhanced cooperation will also ‘result in a progressive fragmenta-
tion of EU’s legal system’ and ‘a progressive erosion of the principle of 
unity of community order’.86 Undertaking of enhanced cooperation very 
often by different groups of states will inevitably lead to an increasingly 
85  T. Kubin, Enhanced cooperation, EMU reforms…, op.cit., p. 98.
86  S. Dudzik, Mechanizm wzmocnionej współpracy na tle konstytucyjnych zasad porządku 
prawnego Unii Europejskiej (Mechanism of enhanced cooperation against the constitutional prin-
ciples of the European Union legal order), „Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego”, No. 1/2003, pp. 
37–38.
51
Tomasz Kubin, A ‘Last Resort’ or a ‘Bypass’? Development of Enhanced Cooperation...
greater diversifi cation of legal standards in the EU member states and to 
an erosion of the uniformity of the acquis communautaire of the EU.
The development of enhanced cooperation is a challenge also for the 
functioning of the EU institutional system. One problem is the partici-
pation in debates and the right to vote of the representatives of the EU 
member states not participating in a given policy. As noted by for ex-
ample Jean-Claude Piris, theoretically, if less than half of the member 
states (9–13) participate in enhanced cooperation and when the consent 
of the Commission is required, one can imagine a situation in which the 
members of the Commission coming from states other than those which 
intend to establish enhanced cooperation, can block the adoption of a de-
cision made by the Commission in this respect. The same applies to the 
European Parliament.87 Hence the mentioned above ideas to legalise di-
verse forms of integration between EU states by concluding a certain kind 
of ‘additional treaty’ for countries wanting to participate in the deepening 
of integration, and in which treaty problems with the functioning of the 
institutions of the EU could be rectifi ed.88 
Another problem in this area is position of the Commission in the con-
text of enhanced cooperation development. On the one hand, the Com-
mission – as ‘a driving force’ of the integration process – theoretically 
should be interested in deepening of integration within the EU legal and 
institutional framework and can be expected as a supporter of the projects 
which result in the deepening of integration. 
On the other hand, enhanced cooperation may be seen a weakening 
of the exclusive legislative initiative of the Commission, as it is the EU 
member states which are the initiators of the establishment of enhanced 
cooperation and they decide on its scope, content, nature, etc. As a ‘guard-
ian of the treaties’, the Commission must take into account maintaining 
the integrity of the EU acquis communautaire, too. And if the Commis-
sion refuses the project of enhanced cooperation, the initiating member 
states have no legal possibilities to force the Commission to reconsider 
and change its decision.
Decisions on enhanced cooperation have been contested at the EU 
Court of Justice (CoJ) by states not participating in this cooperation. Ac-
tions aimed at the establishment of enhanced cooperation in the fi eld of 
the UPP were met with opposition from Spain and Italy (before Italy de-
cided to join the UPP enhanced cooperation). In judgment of 16 April 
87  J.-C. Piris, The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU?, Cambridge 2012, pp. 
118–119.
88  Ibidem, pp. 121–142.
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2013, the EU CoJ considered all the arguments of Spain and Italy as un-
justifi ed and therefore dismissed the complaints of these member states 
(Joint Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11).89 However, in March 2013, Spain 
launched two new challenges with the EU CoJ against the regulations im-
plementing the unitary patent system. In its judgments (5 May, 2015), the 
EU Court of Justice fully dismissed the Spanish claims (Case-146/13).90 
Very interesting opinion relating to this case – and generally to the en-
hanced cooperation – presents Federico Fabbrini, who writes, that EU 
member states are allowed to resort enhanced cooperation ‘only when they 
disagree whether to act jointly at the EU level but not when they disagree how to 
do so’.91 And according to F. Fabbrini ‘the Council had misused its powers in 
authorizing an enhanced cooperation in the case’.92
Just as in the case of the UPP, the decision of the EU Council authoris-
ing the establishment of enhanced cooperation in the fi eld of the FTT was 
challenged in the EU Court of Justice, too. On April 18, 2013, the United 
Kingdom, on the basis of Art. 263 of the TFEU, fi led a complaint for the 
annulment of EU Council decision 13/52/EU in connection with viola-
tion of Art. 327 of the TFEU and Art. 332 of the TFEU and the custom-
ary international law. In its judgement, the EU CoJ refuted both the pleas 
raised by the United Kingdom and dismissed this state’s complaint.93 
So, on the one hand, enhanced cooperation can become also a cause of 
confl ict in the EU. On the other hand, a factor that may relieve possible 
confl ict is when groups of states participating in enhanced cooperation 
and those opposing it are different even if subsequent decisions on en-
hanced cooperation are made and challenged at the EU CoJ by member 
states not participating in this cooperation. This has been the case so far. 
As is the case in many other aspects of the functioning of the EU, today’s 
89  C-274/11 and C-295/11, Kingdom of Spain and Italian Republic v. Council of the 
European Union [2013], ECLI:EU:C:2013:240. See on this case: E. Pistoia, Enhanced co-
operation as a tool to… enhanced integration? Spain and Italy v. Council, “Common Market 
Law Review”, Vol. 51, Issue 1/2014, pp. 247–260. 
90  C-146/13, Kingdom of Spain v. European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union [2015], ELI:EU:C:2015:298 and C-147/13, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the 
European Union [2015], ECLI:EU:C:2015:299.
91  F. Fabbrini, Enhanced Cooperation Under Scrutiny: Revisiting the Law and Practice of 
Multi-speed Integration in the Light of the First Involvement of the EU Judiciary, “Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration”, Vol. 40/2013, Issue 3, pp. 197–224. 
92  Ibidem. 
93  C-209/13, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of the 
European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2014:283. See also on this case: M. Randall, Case C-209/13 
UK v. Council: enhanced cooperation and the FTT, “Legal Issues of Economic Integration”, 
Vol. 41/2014, Issue 4, pp. 407–418. 
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allies can become tomorrow’s opponents, which will not prevent them 
from cooperating again the day after that.
Conclusions
In the past, the subsequent stages of EU (EC) widening went together 
with far-reaching measures aimed at deepening integration. However, the 
enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern European states did not 
accompany such deepening. Moreover, for several years the EU has strug-
gled with major crises, what together cause, that one can talk about stag-
nation in the integration process.
The most serious reforms of recent years in the EU were the reforms 
of economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. However, 
most of them affect only the states, whose currency is the euro. Moreover, 
some of these reforms (Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary Union called colloquially ‘the fi scal com-
pact’, European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism ) have been adopted outside the EU legal frame-
work. This proves, that it is very diffi cult for the EU to reach an agree-
ment quickly even in a crisis situation.
 And the treaties do not include any effective safeguard clause pre-
venting Member States from moving outside the treaties’ framework by 
establishing an international agreement.
The evolution of the legal basis for enhanced cooperation – from TA to 
TL – is clearly aimed at facilitating its establishment.94 For over a decade 
this form of cooperation has not been used, but since 2010 it has already 
been introduced fi ve times. In addition, a special form of closer defence 
cooperation, PESCO, will probably be established in the near future. In 
this way, enhanced cooperation has become a constant form of coopera-
tion in the EU.
One of the strengths of enhanced cooperation is that it allows for inte-
gration within the EU legal framework and with the use of the EU insti-
tutions. It is a compromise between an increasingly diffi cult and increas-
ingly time-consuming Community method and intergovernmental agree-
ments outside the EU legal framework. Perhaps, without such a form of 
cooperation, the EU Member States would undertake integration activi-
ties outside the EU on an even larger scale. It should be noted that this 
94  On possible changes in the procedure for establishing and joining the enhanced co-
operation, which would make it more fl exible see for example: F. Amtenbrink, D. Kochen-
ov, owards a more fl exible approach to ernhanced cooperation in: 50 Years of European Integra-
tion: Foundations and Perspectives, A. Ott, E. Vos (eds.), The Hague 2009, pp. 181–200.
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problem is very important for the functioning of the EU. Steve Peers puts 
the question: ‘are we witnessing the birth of a new form of European Union 
law?’.95 And, analyzing the problem of using of the EU institutions in the 
light of the EU CoJ jurisdiction, states: ‘partial agreements using the EU 
institutions could play an increasingly important role in the EU legal framework 
– to the extent that they might rightly be considered a new form of EU law and 
that this case is “so prevalent, so controversial and so important in practice” that 
it should be taken and clarifi ed with the treaties revision’.96 
The increasing importance of enhanced cooperation in the context 
of stagnation in the integration process, however, raises the question of 
whether, because of its importance for deepening the diversity of integra-
tion in the EU, enhanced cooperation is not abused.
That is, is it really the last resort or rather a comfortable tool to by-
pass a group of the EU states reluctant to deepening integration? The 
analysis of the cases of enhanced cooperation indicates, that it addresses 
issues relevant for the functioning of the EU and which trigger confl icts 
between the EU Member States. It can also raise serious problems con-
cerning the uniformity of the EU legal order, institutional system and 
the EU values. Establishing enhanced cooperation takes a lot of time, so 
it is unsuitable when a quick decisions are necessary. In the case of euro 
area reforms, intergovernmental solutions have been used outside the EU 
legal framework. At the same time, it can not be ruled out, that enhanced 
cooperation in the future will also be used in the area of economic govern-
ance in the EU.97
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